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They  can  do  so  by  aggregating  the 
Member  States’  maritime  assets—
particularly  overseas  naval  stations—
under  the  European  Union’s  umbrella 
to  project  a  ‘forward  presence’  and 
protect  key  trade  lines  and  zones  of 
critical  interest  to  the  European 
economy.  While  the  Chinese,  Indian, 
Russian  and  South  Korean  navies  are 
continuing to grow in size and power, 
Europeans  have  become  increasingly 
‘sea  blind’.  In  order  to  remedy  this 
problem,  we  must  look  back  to  our 
history  and  realise  that  our  economic 
and social success was grounded in our 
maritime  strength—and  that  the 
European  Union’s  prosperity  will 
depend just as much on our sea power 
in the twenty-first century. 
In Egmont Paper No. 33 ‘The Value of 
Power, the Power of Values: A Call for 
an EU Grand Strategy’, edited by Sven 
Biscop, Egmont calls for an EU Grand 
Strategy  completing  the  European 
Security  Strategy  by  identifying  EU 
interests  and  setting  concrete 
objectives. A proactive EU, acting as a 
true global power, must result. Some of 
Europe’s leading strategic thinkers react 
to  Egmont’s  proposals  in  its  series  of 
Security Policy Briefs. 
In  this  paper  of  the  Grand  Strategy 
Project  series,  young  British  scholar 
James Rogers argues that we Europeans 
must begin to focus more on maritime 
geostrategy. 
Their differing conceptions of space and of the conquest of space indicate one of the outstanding differences between land and sea 
powers. A sea power conquers a large space by leaping lightly from point to point, adjusting itself to existing political relationships 
wherever possible, and often not establishing its legal control until its factual domination has long been tacitly recognised. An 
expanding land power moves slowly and methodically forward, forced by the nature of its terrain to establish its control step by step 
and so preserve the mobility of its forces. Thus a land power thinks in terms of continuous surfaces surrounding a central point of 
control, while a sea power thinks in terms of points and connecting lines dominating an immense territory. 
– Nicholas Spykman, 1938 
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Since  its  inception  in  the  1950s,  the  European 
Union has acted like a traditional land power, much 
like  Germany  or  Russia.  Forced  by  geopolitical 
impediments  and  a  desire  to  maintain  internal 
cohesion,  it  has  moved  slowly  and  methodically 
forward,  establishing  its  geographical  control  step 
by step. It has conquered space through territorial 
enlargement, pushing its frontiers initially north and 
west (to include Denmark and the British Isles), and 
then  south  and  east  (to  include  Spain,  Portugal, 
Greece, East Germany, Austria, Poland, and so on). 
This  has  proven  to  be  a  very  difficult  process, 
requiring  a  series  of  systematic  alterations  to  the 
countries  seeking  accession—in  other  words,  the 
full implementation of the acquis communautaire and 
their alignment with the common European policy. 
More  importantly,  it  has  also  required  ongoing 
reform  to  the  structures  governing  the  European 
Union itself. This is what the Single European Act, 
the  Treaty  of  Maastricht  and  the  Treaty  of 
Amsterdam  aimed  to  do  after  the  waves  of 
enlargement  in  1973/1981,  1990  and  1995.  And 
likewise, the recent passing of the Treaty of Lisbon 
in December 2009 was also designed to modify the 
political nucleus and make it more responsive to the 
needs of a much more heterogeneous community, 
after  two  large  waves  of  expansion  in  2004  and 
2007, whereby twelve new Member States and 120 
million  more  people  were  embedded  into  the 
European enterprise. 
The European Union: A Natural Sea Power 
Although the European Union has acted like a land 
power  for  the  past  fifty  years,  it  actually  has  the 
geographical predilection primarily of a sea power 
(see map, below). While the European Union shares a 
lengthy land border with Russia, it retains a natural 
maritime geography: it sits on a jagged peninsular 
surrounded on three fronts by ocean, and only one 
front by land. To the north is the icy Arctic Ocean; 
to the west are the vast depths of the Atlantic; to 
the  south  are  the  warm  blue  waters  of  the 
Mediterranean Sea; to the south east is the Black 
Sea; while to the east sit the wind-swept expanses of 
the  Eurasian  steppe.  This  jagged  European 
peninsular has some of the best agricultural land in 
the world, which is nourished by the warm winters 
provided  by  another  maritime  asset:  the  Gulf 
Stream.  The  European  homeland  is  also  richly 
endowed with raw materials and dense forests made 
possible  by  this  maritime  position,  as  well  as 
numerous  natural  harbours  and  navigable  rivers 
with  direct  access  to  the  sea.  It  was  from  these 
ports  that  European  explorers,  traders  and 
conquerors  set  out  to  establish  economic  and 
political  relations  with  other  parts  of  the  world, 
which  allowed  Europeans  to  acquire  the  greatest 
concentration  of  wealth  and  power  in  human 
history.  From  Henry  the  Navigator,  Christopher 
Columbus  and  John  Cabot  onwards,  European 
history has been heavily entwined with and shaped 
by interaction with the maritime environment. 
This maritime heritage has contributed to making 
the European Union’s economy the world’s biggest, 
accounting  for  approximately  one-third  of  annual 
global economic output.1 Belgium, Britain, France, 
Germany and the Netherlands —which  form  the 
European  Union’s  pulsating  economic  heart—are 
more dependent on international trade than almost 
any  other  society  in  the  world  and  require 
unfettered  oceanic  access  for  their  imports  and 
exports.  The  great  European  ports  of  Antwerp, 
Zeebrugge,  Rotterdam,  Hamburg,  London  and 
Felixstowe are our outlets and inlets to and from 
the rest of the world. With an increasingly ‘just-in-
time’ approach to the delivery of energy, products 
and raw materials, any disruption can cause major 
downstream consequences.  2 Any disruption could 
harm  an  entire  distribution  network  and  the 
European consumers entwined within that network, 
leading  to  wider  industrial  decay.  So  as  the 
economic powerhouse of the global economy, the 
European  Union  needs  the  world’s  international 
maritime trade lines  to be  secure, more than any 
other  country,  including  China  and  the  United 
States. 
Significantly, the passing  of  the Treaty of Lisbon 
comes at a time when the European Union’s land 
power geostrategy has given us pervasive influence 
over the entire European continental zone, meaning 
that we can begin to look beyond our homeland. 
                                                            
1 Based on nominal figures. 
2 Lee Willett (2008), ‘British Defence and Security: The Maritime 
Contribution’,  Occasional Paper,  London:  Royal  United  Services 
Institute, p. 4.   
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Indeed, so successful has this approach been that—
short  of  a  few  small  peripheral  countries  in 
Scandinavia,  Central  Europe  and  the  Former 
Yugoslavia—European  enlargement  has  probably 
reached its logical conclusion. Apart from Turkey, 
which  from  a  geopolitical  perspective,  forms  an 
extremely  risky  candidate  for  accession,  there  is 
nowhere left to go.3 It is in this sense that the first 
decade of the twenty-first century might be for the 
European  Union  as  the  last  decade  of  the 
nineteenth  century  was  for  the  United  States: 
‘Manifest Destiny’ has effectively been reached and 
the frontier will soon be closed.4 And as the period 
                                                            
3  Many  Europeans  are  reluctant  to  allow  Turkey  into  the 
European  Union  for  cultural  and  demographic  reasons. 
However,  just  as  important  and  often  overlooked,  are 
geostrategic needs: do Europeans really want to share borders 
with countries like Iran, Iraq and Syria? Do they really want to 
become a Middle Eastern land power? 
4 Throughout the nineteenth century, the United States was pre-
occupied  with  territorial  consolidation,  widely  known  as 
‘Manifest Destiny’. But by 1890, most of the interior of North 
America was under Washington’s political jurisdiction, meaning 
the  United  States  could  refocus  its  attention  on  the  outside 
world. It can be no co-incidence that less than twenty years after 
the frontier’s closure that all vestiges of European colonial rule 
in  America’s  own  backyard  had  been  cleared  out  and  that 
Washington had equipped itself with what was at the time one of 
the world’s most formidable navies (i.e. the Great White Fleet). 
between 1895 and 1910 witnessed the emergence of 
the  United  States  as  the  dominant  power  in  the 
Western  Hemisphere—and  then  a  nascent  global 
power—the period between 2010 and 2020 might 
turn out to be a similar period of transition for the 
European Union, but only if Europeans have the 
courage  and  political  will  to  make  it  so.  Indeed, 
empowering the European Union and providing it 
with a successful Grand Strategy might turn out to 
be the only way of ensuring that we remain capable 
of  punching  at  our  correct  weight  during  the 
twenty-first century.5 
Why Sea Power Still Matters 
Sea  power,  when  wedded  to  a  well-thought-out 
maritime  geostrategy,  facilitates  the  application  of 
maritime assets (e.g. warships, coast guard vessels, 
naval stations) to gain influence over particular and 
geographically sensitive spaces on the global map. 
The location of these spaces depends on a country’s 
geographical  position,  along  with  its  trade  routes 
and commercial partners. Any power with a heavily 
                                                            
5 The most recent call for a European Union Grand Strategy has 
been made by Sven Biscop et. al. (2009), ‘The value of power, 
the power of values: a call for an EU Grand Strategy’, Egmont 
Paper No. 33, Brussels: Egmont Institute.  
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globalised  and  technologically  powerful  economy 
must place this objective at the crux of its foreign 
policy, lest other countries or non-state actors like 
pirates  rise  up  to  cut  or  frustrate  these  critical 
arteries.6  In  maintaining  such  a  system,  the 
dominant  power  frequently  provides  an 
international public good, that others often buy into 
and help maintain. The Dutch and the British once 
operated on such a level, while France, Spain and 
Portugal  were  not  far  behind.  For  the  United 
Provinces in the seventeenth century, the principal 
focus was on the spice trade in South East Asia. 
Dutch  sea  lines  of  communication  were  strung 
together, eventually stretching around the Iberian 
peninsula, the African continent, and around India, 
down into the Straight of Malacca, and onward up 
into  Japan.  Likewise,  particularly  after  the 
construction of the Suez Canal in the nineteenth 
century, the Mediterranean, the Red Sea and the 
Indian  Ocean  emerged  as  the  ‘imperial  lifeline’ 
between  the  United  Kingdom  and  its  numerous 
colonial  holdings,  from  India  and  Burma  to 
Australia,  New  Zealand  and  Hong  Kong.  Both 
countries built forts and barracks, naval stations and 
trading posts to guard these precious routes. 
Since the end of the Second World War, the United 
States Navy has picked up where the Royal Navy 
left  off.  American  military  installations  were 
constructed  in  key  maritime  theatres  to  facilitate 
rapid  power  projection  into  and  across  the  main 
trade lines and to discourage hostile intentions on 
the  part  of  competitors,  not  least  Soviet  Russia. 
This provided the United States with a geostrategic 
perspective very near to that of Europeans in the 
past. But whereas the British and Dutch focussed 
on the Indian Ocean, America’s interests were in 
South and Central America, Western  Europe, the 
Middle  East  and  East  Asia,  which  formed  an 
enormous residual zone of vital importance to the 
American  economy.7  Even today, these areas are 
                                                            
6 For one of the most comprehensive studies ever undertaken on 
geopolitical  power,  albeit  from  an  American  perspective,  see: 
Nicholas Spykman (1944), The Geography of the Peace, New York: 
Harcourt,  Brace  and  Company,  Inc.  See  also:  Jacob  Grygiel 
(2006), The Great Powers and Geopolitical Change, Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press. 
7  This  was  first  realised  by  the  War  and  Peace  Studies 
programme in 1941, organised by the Washington-based Council 
on  Foreign  Relations.  The  participants  of  this  programme 
described this huge zone as the ‘Grand Area’. 
where the majority of American trade is conducted, 
and where much of the raw materials that fuel the 
American  economy  come  from.  With  over  five-
hundred military installations peppered throughout 
these zones, backed up by several aircraft carriers 
and  escorting  air  and  naval  squadrons, 
Washington’s network of bases is extensive. These 
provide  ‘strategic  trampolines’,  which  enable  the 
United  States’  armed  forces  to  jump  across  the 
world and lock it down under some semblance of 
order preferable to American interests. Backed up 
by  the  major  European  sea  powers  (i.e.  Britain, 
France and the Netherlands), the United States has 
since  guarded  the  oceans  and  provided  the 
foundations of late-twentieth century globalisation: 
open seas, the principal international public good—
reflected  by  the  fact  that  most  of  the  world’s 
nations have bought into the enterprise. 
Yet today, as American primacy wanes as the world 
tends  towards  greater  multipolarity,  the  United 
States’  ability  to  use  these  facilities  to  shape  the 
global  economic  system  may  become  increasingly 
difficult.  The  key  issue  for  Europeans  is  not 
whether the United States is willing to maintain this 
system, but rather, whether it will be able to do so. 
With  the  rise  of  China,  and  the  refocussing  of 
American maritime assets into East Asia, it seems 
likely that Europeans will be forced to assume more 
of the burden than we once had to—at the very 
least in our immediate maritime approaches—and 
possibly further afield too. In this sense, the current 
European Union naval armada in the Gulf of Aden 
reflects our emerging and our future predicament, 
about the need for open and unfettered access to 
the sea. Other powers now understand this need: 
China has already been installing what in American 
and Australian strategic circles has been described 
as  a  ‘String  of  Pearls’.  These  so-called  ‘pearls’, 
following  Chinese  oil  routes  to  the  Middle  East, 
comprise a number of harbours, listening posts and 
airstrips that link China’s southern coastline to the 
entrance  of  the  Persian  Gulf.  This  is  how 
Christopher  Pehrson,  who  wrote  one  of  the  first 
academic studies on this strategy, puts it: 
Each “pearl” in the “String of Pearls” is a nexus of 
Chinese  geopolitical  influence  or  military  presence. 
Hainan Island, with recently upgraded military facilities, 
is a “pearl”. An upgraded airstrip on Woody Island,  
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located in the Parcel archipelago three-hundred nautical 
miles  east  of  Vietnam,  is  a  “pearl”.  A  container 
shipping facility in Chittagong, Bangladesh, is a “pearl”. 
Construction of a deep water port in Sittwe, Myanmar, 
is a “pearl”, as is the construction of a navy base in 
Gwadar, Pakistan.8 
The  aim  of  these  ‘pearls’  is  to  form  a  wide 
distribution  network to  protect the transportation 
of  resources  from  countries  around  the  Indian 
Ocean to China’s factories and provide Beijing with 
a  foothold  in  the  Indian  Ocean.  Obviously,  this 
brings  Chinese  power  into  contact  with  India, 
whose  geostrategic  ambitions  are  also  growing. 
Recently, New Delhi proclaimed in its most up-to-
date  naval  review  its  own  ‘manifest  destiny’:  in 
short, dominance over the ocean bearing its name.9 
And rumours abound about Moscow’s intentions in 
Yemen,  Syria,  Abkhazia  (Georgia),  and  even  the 
Arctic coast. Russia certainly intends to modernise 
its fleet.10  
So as China and India rise; as Russia’s emergence as 
a  maritime  power  begins;  and  as  other  smaller 
powers—from Japan, South Korea to Australia—
react and rearm to meet these potential challenges, 
their  geostrategies  will  cut  across  the  European 
Union’s main arteries to the Middle East, the Indian 
Ocean,  South  East  Asia,  East  Asia  and 
Australasia—again,  all  in  regions  of  critical 
significance to our homeland and in some cases just 
a stone’s throw away from some of our Member 
States. How will these new military bases affect the 
balance of power in those regions? How will the 
countries concerned react? And how will it affect 
us?  After  all,  our  trade  routes  hang  like  delicate 
necklaces  around  the  southern  underbelly  of  the 
Eurasian landmass and already run through some of 
the world’s most vulnerable ‘choke points’. These 
include the Bab-el-Mandeb, the Gulf of Aden and 
the Straits of Hormuz and Malacca. It is therefore 
quite possible that the seas around and leading to 
                                                            
8  Christopher  Pehrson  (2006),  ‘String  of  Pearls:  Meeting  the 
Challenges of China’s Rising Power Across the Asian Littoral’, 
Carlisle Papers in Security Strategy, Carlisle, Pennsylvania: Strategic 
Studies Institute, United States Army War College, p. 3. 
9 Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of Defence (Navy),  Freedom 
to Use the Seas: India’s Maritime Military Strategy, 2007. 
10 Jacob W. Kipp, ‘The Shifting Strategic Priorities of the Russian 
Navy’, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 6, No. 195, 23rd October 2009. 
the European homeland are going to get less secure, 
more hazardous and more prone to disruption than 
we have been used to over the past two decades. In 
short, the maritime zone between the Suez Canal 
and the cities of Shanghai, Seoul and Singapore will 
become much more important to our security.11  
The European Union as a Global Power 
While  the  sea  has  shaped  European  history,  we 
have become increasingly ‘sea blind’—a term widely 
used  to  describe  a  lack  of  knowledge  about  the 
importance  of  sea  power.  While  foreign  powers 
have been busily boosting their naval strength over 
the past decade, we have continued to reduce the 
number  of  our  warships,  while  simultaneously 
downgrading naval spending as a priority. As Paul 
Kennedy has pointed out, it is as if Europeans and 
Asians have reversed their roles: we have forgotten 
our past, and the way in which our command of the 
sea  propelled  us  forward,  while  Asian  countries 
have  taken  on  board  the  lessons  provided  by 
European  history—and  put  them  into  action.12 
Maritime geostrategy has also taken a back seat 
among Europeans, even in historical sea powers 
like  the  United  Kingdom,  the  Netherlands  and 
Spain. In the British Strategic Defenc e Review in 
1998,  it  was  hardly  mentioned  at  all. 13  In  the 
German defence white paper in 2006, it also failed 
to  get  much  of  a  look  in,  although  this  is  less 
surprising given Germany’s traditional position as a 
land  power  par  excellence.14  It was only in the  
French equivalent in 2008 that geostrategic thinking 
became more apparent. 15  In  a  nutshell,  France’s 
white  paper  argued  that  Africa  would  decline  in 
significance  to  French  and  European  security, 
whereas  the  Middle  East  and  the  Indian  Ocean 
would rise in importance. It was for this reason that 
the construction of a French naval station in the 
                                                            
11 James Rogers (2009), ‘From Suez to Shanghai: the European 
Union and Eurasian maritime security’, Occasional Paper 77, Paris: 
European Union Institute for Security Studies. 
12  Paul  Kennedy,  ‘The  Rise  and  Fall  of  Navies’,  International 
Herald Tribune, 5th April 2007. 
13 Ministry of Defence, Strategic Defence Review, 1998. 
14 Federal Ministry of Defence,  White Paper on German Security 
Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr, 2006. 
15 President of the French Republic,  The French White Paper on 
Defence and National Security, 2008.  
 
 
 
EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations 
6 
#1 
September 2009 
United  Arab  Emirates  took  place  in  late  2008, 
which opened last year. 
Reducing  European  sea-blindness  will  require  a 
systematic  transformation  in  the  way  that  the 
European  Union  relates  to  its  surrounding 
geopolitical  environment.  The  old  land  power 
geostrategy will have to give way to—or rather, be 
complimented by—one predicated on sea power. In 
other  words,  rather  than  behaving  like  a  large 
continental  behemoth  seeking  to  surround  itself 
with  continuous  surfaces  surrounding  a  point  of 
control  (extrapolated:  the  European 
Neighbourhood  and  the  Union  for  the 
Mediterranean), the European Union needs to think 
more about how to utilise  points and connecting 
lines on the world’s surface to gain command over 
immense littoral territories, especially the maritime 
approaches  to  the  European  continent.  By 
providing the European Union with a lighter and 
more  dynamic  military  and  geostrategic  footprint, 
this  would  contribute  to  the  maintenance  of  the 
global trade system, and deter potential aggressors 
from usurping the status quo. This is what the naval 
theorist, Alfred Thayer Mahan, had in mind when 
he  declared  that:  ‘Force  is  never  more  operative 
than  when  it  is  known  to  exist  but  is  not 
brandished.’16  
The creation  of a  European  maritime geostrategy 
also ties in directly with our own ambitions. With 
the passing of the Treaty of Lisbon, security and 
defence  policy  at  the  European  level  has  the 
potential for significant functional and geographical 
expansion. What sort of power do we want to be? 
Do we want to remain nothing more than a ‘civilian 
power’, delegating our security to others (who, in 
any case, may not be in a position to help)? Or do 
we  want  to  become  a  ‘normative  power’,  whose 
sole  ambition  is  the  promotion  of  ‘good 
governance’ and ‘effective multilateralism’, perhaps 
with a few small military operations bolted on the 
side? Or should we strive for a greater role on the 
world stage, commensurate with our weight? 
In many ways, the question is a false one: it is not 
necessarily a case of what we want to be, but rather 
                                                            
16 Alfred Thayer Mahan (1912), Armaments and Arbitration or the 
Place  of  Force  in  the  International  Relations  of  States,  New  York: 
Harper and Brothers, p. 105. 
what circumstances thrust upon us. A combination 
of defence inflation in the Member States and the 
sheer size of the new and emerging actors—all large 
continental  powers—suggests  that  to  remain 
relevant,  let  alone  prosperous,  we  must  begin 
harnessing  the  potential  of  the  European  Union 
more  actively  that  we  have  been  doing.  What  is 
needed is a comprehensive strategic defence review 
at  the  European  level,  which  would  consider  the 
Member  States’  existing  assets  and  the  wider 
geostrategies of which they form a part. Europeans 
already  operate  military  installations  around  the 
world—in fact more than any other country bar the 
United  States.17  The existing French and British 
facilities provide an excellent capacity for the future 
projection of the European Union’s influence into 
the  South  Atlantic,  the  Caribbean,  the 
Mediterranean  and  indeed,  even  the  Middle  East 
and the Indian Ocean (see map, below). And unlike 
many American or Chinese facilities, many of our 
military  installations  are  located  on  our  own 
sovereign  territories  overseas  and  include  naval 
harbours, aerodromes and barracks, which could be 
modified, enlarged or upgraded as the need dictates. 
But  a  potential  defence  white  paper  is  not  just 
about challenges and threats, or military forces and 
civilian services and the way in which they should 
be used. It is also about the geographical spaces in 
which they are likely to be deployed and sustained 
as a deterrent, both now and in the near and distant 
futures. Any European review should give extensive 
attention  to  this  issue;  while,  for  example,  the 
current  focus  will  remain  on  the  European 
Neighbourhood  and  Middle  East—with  growing 
attention given to the Indian Ocean region—it is 
likely that other areas will become important.  
Indeed,  one  day,  we  may  need  more  overseas 
military  bases,  in  different  locations,  and  with  a 
different posture and focus, such as in the Arctic 
zone. A strategic defence review should therefore 
by  supplemented  by  a  degree  of  geostrategic 
forecasting,  much  like  the  projections  undertaken 
                                                            
17  See:  James  Rogers  and  Luis  Simón (2009),  The  Status  and 
Location of the Military Installations of the Member States of 
the European Union, Brussels: European Parliament.  
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every five years by the National Intelligence Council 
in the United States.18 
So  if  the  European  Union  is  to  assume  more 
responsibilities, particularly in security and defence, 
it will have to think wider and more like a globally -
oriented sea power. Europeans will only retain a 
superpower-sized economy and a high degree of 
social and political cohesion—the prerequisites for 
prosperity—if we defend and extend our interests 
as  an  integrated  bloc.  This  will  require  a  sound 
maritime geostrategy to compliment our land power 
presence  in  Eastern  Europe  and  Central  Eurasia, 
drawing  together  our  civilian  services,  our  armed 
forces,  our  overseas  military  installations,  our 
strategic  historical  knowledge  and  our  values  and 
interests.  A future strategic defence review at the 
European-level, resulting in a while paper, should 
enable us to achieve that. 
                                                            
18  National  Intelligence  Council,  Global  Trends  2025:  A 
Transformed World, 2008. 
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